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The Consequences of the Growth of
Health Insurance Premiums
By KATHERINE BAICKER AND AMITABH CHANDRA*
In the United States, two-thirds of the non-
elderly population is covered by employer-
provided health insurance (EHI).1 According to
a Kaiser Family Foundation national survey
(2003), the cost of EHI has increased by over 59
percent since 2000 with no accompanying in-
crease in the scale or scope of benefits. These
increases in health insurance premiums may
have significant effects on labor markets, in-
cluding changes in the number of jobs, hours
worked per employee, wages, and compensa-
tion packages. Indeed, it is possible that a sig-
nificant portion of the increase in the uninsured
population may be a consequence of employers
shedding this benefit as health insurance premi-
ums rise.
Understanding how labor-market characteris-
tics affect adjustments to increased health insur-
ance costs is of vital policy importance. Some
proposals to cover the uninsured rely on “em-
ployer mandates” requiring employers to cover
eligible workers. Other proposals provide tax
credits for the purchase of non-employer health
insurance. The effects of these proposals on
employment, wages, and health insurance cov-
erage will be driven by the elasticities of labor
supply and demand, institutional constraints on
wages and compensation packages, and how
much workers value the increase in health in-
surance costs. Since employers provide such
coverage voluntarily, if workers fully value
these benefits and are able to sort between firms
based on their preferences, then (in the absence
of other institutional constraints) they will bear
the cost of the increase via reduced wages, with
no accompanying change in employment, em-
ployment costs, or employee utility.2 There are
many reasons to believe, however, that firms are
limited in their ability to offset increases in the
price of health insurance premiums through
lower compensation, so that increases in the
cost of providing health insurance may affect
both employment and the structure of work.
Identifying the magnitude of these effects
empirically is difficult both because of data
availability and because of multiple avenues for
causality. In this paper we uncover the causal
effect of increases in the cost of benefits on
labor-market outcomes by exploiting an exoge-
nous source of variation in the cost of providing
health insurance: the recent “medical malprac-
tice crisis” in which malpractice costs for phy-
sicians grew dramatically in some states but not
in others. The growth in malpractice payments
affects malpractice insurance premiums and
health insurance premiums, but it should not
affect other aspects of employment (see Baicker
and Chandra, 2005b). Using this source of vari-
ation, we examine the effect of increases in
health insurance premiums on employment pat-
terns, earnings, and health insurance coverage.
We find that the cost of increases in health
insurance premiums is borne in large part by
workers through increased unemployment and
also through decreased hours for those workers
moved from full-time jobs with benefits to part-
time jobs without. These results have strong
implications for the distributional impact of
health-care reforms.
* Both authors: Economics Department, Dartmouth Col-
lege, 6106 Rockefeller Hall, Hanover, NH 03755, Dart-
mouth Medical School, and National Bureau of Economic
Research (e-mails: kbaicker@dartmouth.edu, achandra@
dartmouth.edu). We thank Alan Garber, Seth Seabury,
Jonathan Skinner, and Douglas Staiger for helpful conversa-
tions that have influenced this research program, and Derek
Neal, Aaron Yelowitz, and conference participants at the
Berger Conference for very insightful comments. We are
grateful for funding from NIA-P01 AG19783-02. The opinions
in this paper are those of the authors and should not be
attributed to the NIA or NBER.
1 Based on tabulations of population under age 65 from
the March Current Population Survey for 1988–2003.
2 There is a wide literature estimating the wage–fringe
trade-off. A $1 increase in the value of fringes may be offset
by a $1 reduction in wages—or a $1/(1  tax rate) reduc-
tion for tax-favored benefits. For example, Jonathan Gruber
(1994) demonstrates that the passage of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act in 1978 resulted in employers shifting
the entire cost of the mandate onto employees.
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I. Analytical Framework
Lawrence H. Summers (1989) outlined the
effects of mandated benefits (versus taxes) on
wages and employment, highlighting the impor-
tance of the employees’ valuation of the benefit.
The provision of a benefit that is fully valued by
workers should not change employment, but
should decrease wages by the cost of the bene-
fit. There are, however, several reasons that this
adjustment may not occur. First, a price increase
may have a different effect on workers’ valua-
tion of benefits than an increase in the quality or
quantity of benefits provided. Second, workers
may not be perfectly sorted between firms based
on their preferences for benefits, and nondis-
crimination stipulations in the tax code limit the
differentiation of benefit packages to full-time
workers within the same firm. These nondis-
crimination constraints create incentives to
move workers between “covered” (with bene-
fits) full-time jobs and “uncovered” part-time
jobs. Third, the ability of firms to reduce wages
for lower-skilled workers is restricted by the
minimum wage. For these three reasons, in-
creases in the cost of health insurance (HI)
could affect both total compensation and em-
ployment. We thus need to evaluate the effect of
rising health premiums on employment, wages,
hours worked, and the composition of employ-
ment (the share of jobs that are full-time or
part-time) empirically. We estimate
(1) Outcomest  s  t  1Cost of HIst
 XstB  i
where observations are at the state-year level
and X includes a number of economic and de-
mographic controls. Estimating these effects
using ordinary least squares poses several prob-
lems. Data sets such as the Census and the
Current Population Survey (CPS) do not con-
tain information on the employer costs of health
insurance or the generosity of the plan.3 Even
when this information is available, researchers
may not be able to control adequately for
worker characteristics, such as ability, that
might also influence outcomes.4 David Cutler
and Brigitte Madrian (1998) estimate a similar
equation using imputed premiums and conclude
that rising health insurance premiums result in
increased hours worked per employee, but they
do so without the benefit of a source of exoge-
nous variation in premiums.
In our analysis, we use per capita medical
malpractice payments as an instrument for
health insurance premiums to overcome these
empirical obstacles. The “medical malpractice
crisis” that began at the turn of the 21st century
saw a dramatic increase in physician premiums
for malpractice insurance. M. M. Mello et al.
(2003), Chandra et al. (2005), and Baicker and
Chandra (2005a) provide an overview of this
crisis and its underlying causes and conse-
quences. If the demand for health services is
inelastic, then the effect of increasing malprac-
tice payments on malpractice premiums will
have little effect on net physician compensation,
but will instead be borne by consumers of health
care through increases in the price of health care
(and, consequently, health insurance premi-
ums).5 We thus use increases in malpractice
payments as an instrument for health insurance
premiums to estimate the following first-stage
equation:
(2) Cost of HIst  s  t
 1Malpractice paymentsst
 Xst i
where observations are at the state-year level
and malpractice payments are broken down by
the size and number of payments for different
specialties. Instrumenting for health insurance
premiums removes both the bias from classical
measurement error as well as the bias from
omitted variables. This is because the instru-
ment only picks up that part of the (within-state)
3 It is also not clear whether (if asked) respondents
would know the costs or generosity of their health insurance
plan (see Alan L. Gustman and Thomas L. Steinmeier,
2001).
4 These limitations are identical to those that have
plagued the literature on identifying the wage–fringe
tradeoff (see Janet Currie and Brigitte Madrian [1999] for a
comprehensive overview).
5 In theory we could also use malpractice premiums as
an instrument for health insurance premiums, but limita-
tions of malpractice insurance data make this less practical
(Baicker and Chandra, 2005b).
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variation in premiums that is attributable to
(within-state) changes in malpractice climate.6
We then include the instrumented premium on
the right-hand side of regressions estimating
various labor-market outcomes, including em-
ployment, hours worked, and health insurance
coverage.
II. Data
Data for this analysis come from several
different sources, documented more fully in
Baicker and Chandra (2005b). Annual state-
year-level data on health insurance premiums
by type (family or individual) and employer size
(under 50 or larger) come from the Kaiser Fam-
ily Foundation/HRET survey for 1996–2001
(see Kaiser Family Foundation, 2003). Labor-
market outcomes, health insurance coverage,
and demographic data are obtained from the
March Current Population Survey (CPS) for
1996–2002. We assign health insurance premi-
ums to workers based on their state of resi-
dence, year, family structure, and firm size, and
then aggregate premiums, covariates, and labor-
market outcomes to the state-year level. Medi-
cal malpractice payment information comes
from the National Practitioner Data Bank (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services,
2004), where all malpractice payments made in
the United States by or on behalf of a licensed
health care provider must be reported. We cal-
culate the size and number of payments result-
ing from medical treatments, surgical treatments,
obstetrical treatment, and other treatments. All
dollar amounts are deflated using the CPI.
III. Results
We begin with an examination of the effect of
increases in health insurance premiums on em-
ployment, wages, and hours worked. All regres-
sions include state and year fixed effects and
covariates (including categorical variables for
gender, marital status, race, education, and
health) and are weighted by state population.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Premiums, income, and hours are all measured
in logs. We use the log of medical malpractice
payments (including real per capita dollars and
the number of payments per capita, by specialty,
current and lagged) to instrument for the log of
health insurance premiums. The instruments are
jointly significant (p value of 0.00002) and sug-
gest that when per capita malpractice payments
double, health insurance premiums increase by
1–2 percent, consistent with previous estimates
(see D. P. Kessler and M. B. McClellan, 1996).
Results from two-stage least-squares estima-
tion of equation (1), shown in Table 1, suggest
that, when health insurance premiums increase
by 10 percent, the fraction of the population that
is employed goes down by 1.4 percent, while
the fraction of the employed who work full time
goes down by 2.4 percent. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that increasing the cost of
benefits in the presence of constraints on wage
adjustment produces some unemployment, and
that as the cost of providing health insurance
benefits increases, firms will substitute part-
time workers with limited benefits for full-time
6 Our use of this instrument does not rely on the fact that
workers get more or better health care as their premiums
rise—just that the price of health insurance from all sources
has increased. Workers may be willing to accept lower
wages in exchange for costlier health insurance because
they would have to pay more on the open market for it.
TABLE 1—EFFECT OF HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS ON
EMPLOYMENT
Independent variable
Dependent variable
Wagea Hours Full timeb Empl.c
Employer
HId
Premiums 0.19 0.51 0.24 0.14 0.13
(0.23) (0.19) (0.08) (0.07) (0.21)
r2: 0.95 0.77 0.67 0.88 0.92
N: 284 284 284 284 284
Covariates:e yes yes yes yes yes
Mean:f 26,332 33 0.84 0.82 0.51
Notes: State-year observations are from 1996–2002. Co-
variates include age, race, education, and health status of
population, and state and year fixed effects. Health insur-
ance premiums were instrumented with number and size of
medical malpractice payments. Malpractice liability data
are from National Practitioner Data Bank, health insurance
premiums are from Kaiser/HRET survey, labor market out-
comes are from the March CPS. Regressions are weighted
by population; standard errors are clustered at state level.
The average real HI premium for the sample is $4,894.
a Wage and salary income.
b Fraction of workers who are full-time.
c Fraction of population employed.
d Fraction with employer-provided health insurance.
e Covariates and fixed effects.
f Mean of dependent variable.
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workers with benefits. Figure 1 shows these
regression results graphically.
We might expect certain groups to be more
sensitive to changes in the cost of health insur-
ance. While the average effect on wages is
small, analysis at the individual level in Baicker
and Chandra (2005b) suggests that workers
with health insurance see a substantial reduction
in wages when premiums rise, and that low-
wage workers and manufacturing workers are
much more likely to lose employer health in-
surance or to become unemployed when premi-
ums rise.
IV. Conclusion
Rising health insurance premiums, unem-
ployment, and uninsurance have led to increased
scrutiny of the labor-market consequences of
rising benefits costs. We use variation in med-
ical malpractice payments to disentangle the
causal effect of rising health insurance premi-
ums on wages, employment, and health in-
surance coverage. We find that the cost of in-
creasing health insurance premiums is borne in
large part by workers in the form of decreased
hours and employment. Workers with health
insurance are more likely to see a decrease in
wages, and some workers, such as low-wage
hourly workers whose wages cannot be low-
ered, may face even greater risk of becoming
uninsured as the cost of health insurance
increases.
Together, these estimates demonstrate that the
labor-market effects of rising health insurance are
far from neutral. Whether because workers do not
fully value the increase in the cost of health insur-
ance or because of institutional constraints on
wages or parity of benefit-offering, increases in
health insurance premiums affect both the num-
ber and structure of jobs. Our estimates suggest
that the 40-percent increase in health insurance
premiums seen between 1996 and 2002 could
have been responsible for as much as an
8-percent decrease in full-time work among
the employed, and a 6-percent reduction in
employment.
These results also have strong implications
for employment-based policies designed to in-
crease insurance coverage.7 Many proposals
rely on “employer mandates” to cover the un-
insured. If some classes of workers are exempt
from the mandate (such as part-time workers or
those at particularly small firms), employers are
likely to substitute uncovered jobs for covered
ones, which would make those workers worse
off and reduce the impact of the mandate on
insurance coverage. Where constraints prevent
this kind of substitution and limit employers’
ability to offset the increased cost of employ-
ment by lowering wages, mandates will cause
decreases in employment. More generally, the
7 One example is California’s “Proposition 72.” Aaron
Yelowitz (2004) provides a thorough discussion of this
legislation and estimates its economic impact.
FIGURE 1. (A) EFFECT OF HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUM ON
FRACTION OF POPULATION EMPLOYED AND (B) EFFECT ON
FRACTION OF WORKERS EMPLOYED FULL-TIME
Notes: See notes to Table 1. (A) Regression-adjusted coef-
ficient of 0.14 (robust SE  0.07) from regression of
log(Fraction of population employed) on log(HI premium);
(B) regression-adjusted coefficient of 0.24 (robust SE 
0.08) from regression of log(Fraction of workers employed
full-time) on log(HI premium).
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continuing rise in health insurance premiums
seems likely to increase the ranks of both the
uninsured and the unemployed.
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